No Coercion

I just read a fascinating review by Katherine Mangu-Ward over at Reason Magazine of The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, by Peter Leeson. The author analyzes the actions and customs of 18th century pirates from the standpoint of their being economic actors structuring their lives to maximize their profit. The results were pirates that, in many ways, were quite libertarian.

Here are some particularly interesting excerpts:

But a pirate’s life had less publicized qualities as well: Ships were known among sailors for their relatively decent living conditions, profitsharing opportunities, democratic practices, and racially integrated crews. Life “on the account,” as pirating was known, was often far more civilized than legitimate seamanship.

…

Pirates…were outlaws, with no recognized authorities to settle disputes. So they invented their own ways of doing business. Decades before the American Founders got their act together, pirates were drafting documents full of voting rights, juries, checks and balances, rules for property allocation, even methods for impeachment. The buccaneers may have been less concerned with natural rights than with survival and claiming their fair share of booty, but the end result feels surprisingly like the kind of self-governance we expect from enlightened modern republics. Perhaps even better, since the deal was truly voluntary (for the pirates if not their prey). No one is born a pirate, and everyone has to swear into the contract on each venture.

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Captains were elected, and they could be removed by a vote of the crew. Speeches were given for and against candidates…Speeches also contained warnings and reminders of the power of the people: “Should a Captain be so saucy as to exceed Prescription at any time, why down with him! it will be a Caution after he is dead to his Successors, of what fatal Consequence any sort of assuming may be.”

A ship’s captain received the same lodging and rations as ordinary sailors, and very similar pay…Additional payments, agreed upon in advance, went to those who lost eyes or limbs, a primitive sort of workers’ compensation.

Balancing the powers of the captain was the quartermaster, the captain’s peacetime counterpart. Sort of a den mother with a blunderbuss, he oversaw the distribution of loot and generally kept peace on the ship by enforcing the rules and arbitrating disputes. He too could be replaced at any time by a vote.

They may have been outlaws “without government,” Lesson writes, “but they weren’t without governance.” And here’s where Leeson gets to his lesson. The book is actually an argument for extralegal systems of regulation—for ordered anarchy.

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